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BITTORRENT COPYRIGHT TROLLING:
A PRAGMATIC PROPOSAL FOR A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM
*

Gregory S. Mortenson
1

I. INTRODUCTION

When Adrienne Neal received a letter in the mail from the U.S.
Copyright Group, she chose not to respond because she thought it
2
was a scam. The letter contained a settlement offer, informing Ms.
Neal that she was being sued in federal court for allegedly illegally
3
downloading the copyrighted film Far Cry. The letter notified her
that the plaintiff was willing to settle the matter out of court for a few
4
thousand dollars. Having never heard of the film in question and
confident in her innocence, Ms. Neal ignored the settlement offer
and did not respond to the complaint—particularly because she did
not fully understand the ins-and-outs of the proceedings and could
5
not afford to hire an attorney to fight the charges. In response to
her silence, the U.S. Copyright Group sought a default judgment for
6
full damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. Stories such as these are
*

J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S.B.A, 2006,
Georgetown University. Thanks to my family and friends for their love and support.
1
It is worth noting at the outset that when I began writing this Comment in
August 2010 the topic was, at best, under-analyzed. Since then, a good deal of
scholarship on the issue has emerged, which I have tried to incorporate as fluidly as
possible without altering the essence of my writing. I am grateful that so many
talented thinkers have turned their attention to the topic; I hope this Comment
helps push the discussion forward.
2
Letter from Adrienne Neal at 3, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH
& Co KG v. Adrienne Neal and Does 1–139, No. 1:10-cv-00453-RMC (D.D.C. Mar. 1,
2011), ECF No. 162.
3
Id. The plaintiff initially tried joining 4,577 anonymous “John Doe”
defendants in the lawsuit. See Amended Complaint at 1, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino
Beteiligungs GMBH & Co KG v. Adrienne Neal and Does 1–4,577, No. 1:10-cv-00453RMC (D.D.C. May 12, 2010), ECF No. 12.
4
Letter from Adrienne Neal, supra note 2, at 3. The exact amount of money
requested from Ms. Neal was undisclosed but in another case the plaintiff sought
$3,400 to settle. See Ex. A to Complaint at 2, Seth Abrams v. Hard Drive Productions,
Inc., and Does 1–50, No. 3:12-cv-01006 JCS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012), ECF No. 1
[hereinafter Offer Letter].
5
Letter from Adrienne Neal, supra note 2, at 3.
6
Affidavit in Support of Default at 1, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs
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becoming more common as BitTorrent copyright litigation
flourishes across the country.
Copyright law is derived from Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, which gives Congress the power: “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
8
and Discoveries.” The law of copyright is designed as an incentive
9
for the development of creative works. The United States Copyright
10
Act outlines the types of works that are eligible for copyright
11
12
protection and enumerates the potential remedies for copyright
13
14
holders if their exclusive rights are violated. The Act explicitly
states that copyright infringers can be held liable for either: (1) the
copyright holder’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits, or (2)
if actual damages are difficult to calculate, statutory damages ranging
15
from $750 to $30,000 per infringement.
If a copyright holder
requests statutory damages, the court can increase the maximum
award to $150,000 if the court finds that “infringement was
16
committed willfully.”
The advent of the Internet and peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing
has drastically changed the scope and nature of copyright
17
considerations.
Digital piracy of copyrighted works has had a
GMBH & Co KG v. Adrienne Neal and Does 1–139, No. 1:10-cv-00453-RMC (D.D.C.
Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 157; see also Second Amended Complaint for Copyright
Infringement at 7, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & Co KG v.
Adrienne Neal and Does 1–139, No. 1:10-cv-00453-RMC (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2010), ECF
No. 145.
7
BitTorrent is a specific type of file-sharing technology which will be explained
in depth infra Part III.A.2.
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1569, 1577 (2009) (“Copyright law is thus thought to exist primarily to give
authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter disseminate their
works publicly.”).
10
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006).
11
Id. § 102.
12
Id. §§ 501–513.
13
Id. § 106.
14
The Supreme Court has clarified that in order to “establish [copyright]
infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and
(2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist Pub., Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
15
17 U.S.C. § 504.
16
Id. § 504(c)(2).
17
See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543 (2007) (“The widespread use of peer-to-peer (P2P)
file-sharing technology . . . has enabled ordinary Americans to become mass
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profound effect on the media industry worldwide. Although new
business models, like that of Hulu, are emerging to help monetize
19
digital content, piracy is still attractive to some Internet users.
20
21
22
Industries such as film, video games, computer software, and
23
music have all felt the effects of piracy. As these industries have
copyright infringers with spectacular ease.”). To be clear, a P2P network is any
network that “allow[s] users to share large files directly with one another without
going through a central server.” Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C.
Cir. 2010). Both Napster and BitTorrent are examples of P2P.
18
Illegal Downloading and Media Investment: Spotting the Pirates, ECONOMIST, Aug.
20, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21526299 (discussing how
consumer attitudes towards piracy around the world have a direct effect on the
amount of money invested by companies in creating media).
19
See, e.g., Devin Coldewey, Delay On Hulu Availability More Than Doubles Piracy of
Fox Shows, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 22, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/08/22/delay
-on-hulu-availability-more-than-doubles-piracy-of-fox-shows/ (eight-day delay in
original air-date and Hulu availability can encourage some fans to obtain the shows
illegally—especially with newfound sense of “getting something for nothing”
entitlement that consumers have in the digital age); see also Chris Welch, ‘Game of
Thrones’ Season Premiere Illegally Downloaded Over One Million Times, THE VERGE (Apr. 1,
2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/1/4171792/game-of-thrones-season-threepremiere-pirated-one-million-times (noting that one million illegal downloads
occurred less than twenty-four hours after the premiere, even though HBO “allowed
customers to stream Game of Thrones via HBO Go at the same time that cable
subscribers watched it live”).
20
In 2011, the most-pirated film, Fast Five, was illegally downloaded via
BitTorrent over 9,000,000 times, which astoundingly was a decrease from 2010’s
most-pirated film, Avatar— illegally downloaded 16,000,000 times. Drew Olanoff,
The Most Pirated Movie in 2011 was Downloaded 9,260,000 Times, THE NEXT WEB (Dec.
24, 2011), http://thenextweb.com/media/2011/12/24/the-most-pirated-movie-in2011-was-downloaded-9260000-times/.
21
It is estimated that three-quarters of the video games released in late 2010 and
early 2011 were shared illegally. Editorial, Going After the Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/opinion/sunday/goingafter-the-pirates.html.
22
One study claimed that in 2009 over forty percent of software programs
installed on computers around the world were obtained illegally. BUSINESS SOFTWARE
ALLIANCE, PIRACY IMPACT STUDY: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF REDUCING SOFTWARE
PIRACY (Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://portal.bsa.org/piracyimpact2010/index
.html.
23
Total revenue from U.S. music sales and licensing was $14.6 billion in 1999;
the 2009 figure was only $6.3 billion. David Goldman, Music’s Lost Decade: Sales Cut in
Half, CNNMONEY (Feb. 3, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/compa
nies/napster_music_industry/. The International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (IFPI), a recording industry trade group, claims that in 2008 ninety-five
percent of all music downloaded online was obtained illegally. Legal Downloads
Swamped by Piracy, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technolog
y/7832396.stm. The IFPI alleges that digital piracy accounted for thirty percent of
the decline in global music sales from 2004 to 2009, Eric Pfanner, Music Industry
Counts the Cost of Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/business/global/22music.html,
but
not
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learned, effectively enforcing copyright in the digital age is difficult if
24
not futile.
The 1999 release of Napster, a file-sharing application geared
towards digital music, was a watershed moment for copyright law;
25
Napster helped bring digital piracy into the mainstream.
The
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), a music industry
trade group, responded to a perceived increase in copyright
26
violations with a flood of lawsuits beginning in 2003. These lawsuits
were largely designed to dissuade potential illegal downloading by
threatening litigation and raising awareness of the illegality of most
27
file-sharing.
But after suing approximately 35,000 individuals
during the ensuing five years, the RIAA officially announced the end
28
of its copyright litigation campaign in December 2008.
Some
commentators attributed the “sudden shift” in strategy to the high
financial costs involved, negative associated public relations, and
29
overall ineffectiveness at preventing illegal downloading.
Despite the RIAA’s absence, copyright litigation has soared in
the past few years largely due to pockets of the film industry taking
30
over where the RIAA left off. Indeed, since the beginning of 2010,
well over 200,000 individual defendants have been sued in the United

everyone agrees with this “piracy hurts sales” conclusion. See Music Sales are not
Affected by Web Piracy, Study Finds, BBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/technology-21856720 (reporting on a study of 16,000 Europeans—which the
IFPI called “flawed and misleading”—concluding that music sales are not hampered
by digital piracy).
24
See generally Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 63, 66–67 (2002–2003) (noting the “limited capacity of existing legal
protections to combat digital piracy”) (internal citation omitted).
25
See Corey Rayburn, After Napster, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 16, 17 (2001) (describing
Napster—even in its “defunct state”—as a “cultural phenomenon”).
26
RIAA v. The People, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 30, 2008),
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later.
27
Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 19, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137
.html.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
One judge characterized the trend as a “nationwide blizzard of civil actions
brought by purveyors of pornographic films alleging copyright infringement by
individuals.” In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 61447, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012). Another judge described the
plaintiffs in these cases as “copyright locusts [who] have descended on the federal
courts” and further lamented that “[i]t is difficult to even imagine the extraordinary
amount of time federal judges have spent on these cases.” Opinion & Order at 3, 3,
n.2, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–4, No. 1:12-cv-02962-HB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4,
2012), ECF No. 11.
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States for allegedly sharing copyrighted material online and this
31
32
Instead of the drawn out and
number continues to grow.
33
expensive courtroom-oriented strategy employed by the RIAA, the
recent crop of BitTorrent copyright litigation relies almost exclusively
34
on pre-trial settlements and thereby completely avoids litigation.
The likely logic of this litigation strategy, which has been dubbed the
35
“settlement letter factory” business model, is that collecting small
settlement payments from a large pool of alleged infringers is
preferable to large payments from a small amount of proven
infringers. The adult movie industry, for example, views this
innovative litigation strategy as a potentially lucrative new revenue
36
Those who file BitTorrent copyright lawsuits are often
stream.
37
referred to as “copyright trolls.”
Copyright trolls have caused a

31

Ernesto, 200,000 BitTorrent Users Sued in the United States, TORRENTFREAK (Aug.
8, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/200000-bittorrent-users-sued-in-the-united-states110808/.
32
See, e.g., the docket report for Capitol Records et al. v. Thomas-Rasset, No.
0:06-cv-01497-MJD-LIB (D. Minn. Apr. 19, 2006), a notorious music file-sharing case
that lasted nearly seven years.
33
One analysis looked at the RIAA’s IRS Form 990 filings between 2004 and
2008 and found that “the RIAA spent roughly $90 million on legal fees to recover
$2.5 million.” James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass
Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 85 n.42
(2012).
34
See Nate Anderson, The “Legal Blackmail” Business: Inside a P2P Settlement Factory,
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 29, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/09
/amounts-to-blackmail-inside-a-p2p-settlement-letter-factory.ars.
35
Id.
36
Nicholas Deleon, Adult Movie Industry Follows RIAA’s Footsteps, Sees Lawsuits as
New Revenue Source, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 31, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/01
/31/adult-movie-industry-follows-riaas-footsteps-sees-lawsuits-as-new-revenue-source/;
Eriq Gardner, New Litigation Campaign Quietly Targets Tens of Thousands of Movie
Downloaders, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com
/blogs/thr-esq/litigation-campaign-quietly-targets-tens-63769 (quoting an attorney
working in the field of BitTorrent copyright litigation as saying: “We’re creating a
revenue stream and monetizing the equivalent of an alternative distribution
channel”).
37
See, e.g., James DeBriyn, supra note 33, at 86 (“A copyright troll is a plaintiff
who seeks damages for infringement upon a copyright it owns, not to be made
whole, but rather as a primary or supplemental revenue stream.”); Jason R. LaFond,
Personal Jurisdiction and Joinder in Mass Copyright Troll Litigation, 71 MD. L. REV.
ENDNOTES 51, 55 (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcont
ent.cgi?article=1019&context=endnotes (“A copyright troll, roughly defined, is a
person or entity that acquires a (usually narrow) license from an original copyright
holder for the sole purpose of suing and obtaining settlements from alleged
infringers.”);
Who
are
copyright
trolls?,
FIGHT
COPYRIGHT
TROLLS,
http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2012) (“Copyright trolls
are law firms or individual lawyers who adopted a lucrative scheme to profit from
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“disruption of the under-enforcement equilibrium” that has
38
historically existed in copyright law. Moreover, because copyright
trolls “have in theory violated none of the law’s formal rules and
principles, copyright law has thus far failed to articulate a coherent
39
basis on which to curb their activities.”
This Comment takes the position that the unscrupulous activities
of copyright trolls should be curbed. Part II of this Comment will
look at the business model used by copyright trolls involved in
BitTorrent copyright litigation. The most crucial aspects of “the
settlement letter factory” model are highlighted, including: joining
together alleged infringers of the copyrighted work into a single
lawsuit for discovery purposes; expedited discovery requests to reveal
the true identities of the anonymous defendants; and the sending of
ominous settlement offers that are designed to induce settlement
without the need for trial. Part III sets forth a multi-faceted and
pragmatic approach to help eradicate the problem of copyright trolls.
The solution is grounded in the acknowledgment of the vastly
different stakeholders involved—indeed, for every copyright troll
hoping to extort easy money out of unsuspecting citizens, there is
likely a genuine content creator interested in protecting the market
for his work. Similarly, for every factually innocent defendant who
should not be made to choose between fighting the false charges in
court or settling, there is likely a bona fide copyright infringer who
knowingly and willingly broke the law and thus should be punished.
The solution attempts to balance these competing interests by
showing different ways in which the copyright troll can be hindered
while still leaving the core of copyright enforcement intact. The
solution encourages judges to inquire into the motives and practices
of BitTorrent copyright plaintiffs, and emphasizes the discretion
judges have over such cases. Part IV concludes that copyright
protections should be encouraged in the digital age but that there is
fine line between overzealous copyright defenders and copyright
trolls.

copyright infringement allegations through extortion. Copyright trolls represent
holders of copyrights on movies (mostly pornography).”).
38
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6–7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150716. Balganesh observes that “the troll’s actions
convert copyright law’s previously actionable but tolerated claims into actionable and
enforced ones, disrupting the implicit equilibrium.” Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
39
Id. at 7.
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II. THE BITTORRENT COPYRIGHT TROLL BUSINESS MODEL
40

Law firms that specialize in BitTorrent copyright litigation are
often referred to as “settlement factories” or “copyright trolls,” and
use a “payup or we’ll getcha” method designed to induce alleged
41
infringers to settle outside of court. Once a defendant is identified,
the plaintiff will offer to settle the matter outside of court for a
42
relatively small fee (usually a few thousand dollars), with the threat
of litigation and its associated stress and expenses hanging over the
43
defendant’s head.
Many alleged infringers—even the factually
innocent—settle the claim since fighting the allegation in court could
result in legal bills of tens of thousands of dollars—many times
44
greater than the settlement demand. Although settlement rates are
usually a closely-guarded secret, one copyright troll “bragged” that
45
forty-five percent of alleged infringers accepted offers of settlement,
while another estimated he has made “[m]ore than a few million
46
[dollars]” settling these suits.
Copyright trolls generally follow the same procedural pattern in
their efforts to elicit settlements from alleged infringers. The first
40

For a list of major players in the area, see generally, Discussions, FIGHT COPYRIGHT
TROLLS, http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/discussions/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
Prenda Law is one of the most notorious copyright trolls. For example, in early 2012,
Prenda Law listed 118 cases in response to a court’s request for “[a] list of the
BitTorrent copyright infringement cases involving multiple joined John Doe
Defendants . . . .” See Ex. A to Declaration of Charles E. Piehl in Response to Minute
Order at 4–6, AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–135, No. 5:11-cv-03336 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24,
2012), ECF No. 43. Prenda’s operations, however, were dealt a significant blow in
early May 2013 and their trolling days appear to be numbered. See Joe Mullin, Prenda
Hammered: Judge Sends Porn-Trolling Lawyers to Criminal Investigators, ARSTECHNICA (May
6, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/prenda-hammered-judgesends-porn-trolling-lawyers-to-criminal-investigators/. However, despite the likely
absence of one of BitTorrent copyright trolling’s most notorious law firms, the
underlying law remains the same—and the problem of BitTorrent copyright trolling
remains unsolved.
41
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 34.
42
In one example, the plaintiff sought $3,400 from the alleged illegal
downloader. See Offer Letter, supra note 4, at 2.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 34.
45
Mick Haig Prods., e.K. v. John Does 1–670, No. 3:10-cv-1900-N, 2011 WL
5104095, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011). This attorney, however, received
$10,000 in sanctions for his “staggering chutzpah” relating to his issuing of 670
unauthorized subpoenas. See Mick Haig Prods. E.K. v. Does 1–670, 687 F.3d 649 (5th
Cir. 2012).
46
Kashmir Hill, How Porn Copyright Lawyer John Steele Has Made a ‘Few Million
Dollars’ Pursuing (Sometimes Innocent) ‘Porn Pirates’, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/10/15/how-porn-copyright-lawyerjohn-steele-justifies-his-pursuit-of-sometimes-innocent-porn-pirates/2/.
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step is to find a copyright holder willing to sue infringers for illegal
47
use of a copyrighted work. Proponents of the “settlement letter
factory” business model often base lawsuits on embarassing films,
such as pornographic movies, in order to maximize the lawsuits’
48
shock value and effectiveness.
The logic is clear: the more
embarrassing the film, the more willing the alleged infringer will be
to accept the settlement offer, so as to avoid being associated with
49
such questionable content.
After identifying which copyrighted work or works will serve as
the basis for the lawsuit, the second step is to find alleged infringers
50
to name in the lawsuit. To expedite the process, copyright holders
utilize companies that specialize in monitoring and tracking P2P
51
networks and illegal downloads.
These companies, like
52
53
GuardaLey, use proprietary software to identify defendants. This
software will allegedly identify and record the Internet Protocol (IP)
54
addresses of the suspected infringers and other pertinent data, such
47

Some copyright trolls will obtain part of the copyright via assignment and file
as plaintiff. This act of “unbundling” is explicitly recognized by Congress and the
Supreme Court. See New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 484 (2001)
(“The 1976 [Copyright] Act recast the copyright as a bundle of discrete ‘exclusive
rights,’ § 106, each of which ‘may be transferred . . . and owned separately,’ §
201(d)(2).”). This was the strategy employed by Righthaven, LLC, although it
partially led to their demise because their assignments did not follow the precise
letter of the law. See Balganesh, supra note 38, at 18–20. To avoid potential
complications, then, an easy workaround is to avoid assignment of the copyright and
have the copyright owner file as plaintiff, presumably splitting any profits after the
fact. Balganesh thus appears mistaken when he writes that “copyright trolling
depends entirely on the transferability of actionable copyright claims.” Balganesh,
supra note 38, at 29.
48
See, e.g., Complaint at 7, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 (listing the copyrighted motion
picture Tiffany Sex With a Supermodel as the basis for the lawsuit).
49
Electronic Frontier Foundation Intellectual Property Director Corynne
McSherry has said that the “added pressure of embarrassment associated with
pornography . . . can convince those ensnared in the suits to quickly pay what’s
demanded of them, whether or not they have legitimate defenses. That’s why it’s so
important to make sure the process is fair.” Nate Anderson, Lawyer Can’t Handle
Opposition, Gives Up on P2P Porn Lawsuit, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/lawyers-cant-handle-opposition-giveup-on-p2p-porn-lawsuit/.
50
Anderson, supra note 34.
51
Id.
52
See GUARDALEY, http://www.guardaley.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2012)
(“GuardaLey uses the most innovative techniques in order to protect your
investments and products including: pictures, video games, software, music and
movies.”).
53
Id.
54
An IP address is a unique identifying number which every network-connected
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as the date and time that the alleged infringement took place.
The third step is to seek joinder of the anonymous defendants
56
via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2).
Joining the
defendants together into a single action allows the plaintiff to seek
damages from all alleged infringers simultaneously, which in turn
allows the copyright troll to maximize return on investment. The
57
filing fee in federal court for a copyright claim is $350 per action.
Thus, plaintiffs can realize astronomical cost savings when courts
allow joinder. For example, one consolidated order granting joinder
of 5,583 unnamed defendants in three separate cases saved the
58
plaintiff nearly $2 million in filing fees.
The fourth step is to learn the true identities of the anonymous
59
“John Doe” defendants. This is perhaps the most crucial step—
without this identifying information, the settlement letters cannot be
60
sent and the copyright troll business model would simply fall apart.
device must have in order to communicate with other devices on that network. What
is an IP Address?, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet
/basics/question549.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). One commentator has likened
it to a social security number. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1739 (2010). For Internet
users using a computer to connect to the Internet, their Internet Service Provider
(ISP) will provide them with an IP address. Id. It is possible to use “geolocation”
services to find a largely accurate answer to where an IP address is based, such as a
particular city, but an IP address alone is not enough to show that the account holder
acted illegally. See Order & Report & Recommendation at 6–8, In re BitTorrent Adult
Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 2:11-cv-03995-DRH-GRB (E.D.N.Y. May 1,
2012), ECF No. 39 (outlining reasons why an IP address alone is insufficient to
identify the infringer).
55
See, e.g., Ex. A to Complaint at 17, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No.
5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 (listing IP address, date and
time of alleged infringement, city, state, ISP, and network type).
56
Examples of seeking joinder in these types of cases are too numerous to list
here, but see, e.g., Complaint at 7, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 (justifying the joinder of the
twenty-two defendants pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)).
57
See, e.g., Fee Schedule – Effective April, 17, 2012, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLO., http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Fees.aspx (last visited Nov. 8,
2012); see also the docket text associated with Complaint, Malibu Media, LLC v. John
Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 (noting the
“Filing fee $ 350 receipt number PPE061599”).
58
Cf. Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C.
Mar. 22, 2011).
59
This Comment uses both “John Doe” and “Doe” interchangeably in reference
to the anonymous defendants sued in these lawsuits.
60
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Serve Third Party Subpoenas Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference at 3, Malibu Media,
LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2012), ECF No. 4
(“Without this [identifying] information, Plaintiff cannot serve the Defendants nor

MORTENSON (DO NOT DELETE)

1114

5/28/2013 2:06 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1105
61

As the provider of the IP address, Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
62
An ISP can
are the only source of this identifying information.
match a particular IP address with the name, address, telephone
63
number, email address, and Media Access Control (MAC) address of
the subscriber assigned to it when the alleged illegal downloading
took place. ISPs, however, often hesitate to comply with copyright
trolls because of the “undue burden” of compliance, generally
64
because of time and financial costs, as well as privacy concerns.
Thus, in response to such hesitation, copyright trolls generally file an
ex parte motion for expedited discovery in conjunction with a request
to subpoena the ISPs to compel them to turn over the identifying
65
information.
Courts generally grant these expedited discovery

pursue this lawsuit to protect its valuable copyrights [Tiffany Sex With a Supermodel].”).
Because this stage is so crucial for the copyright troll, some have argued that at this
stage the court should sua sponte determine whether joinder and personal
jurisdiction are appropriate. LaFond, supra note 37, at 54.
61
An ISP is “any organization through which you can arrange Internet access.”
What is an Internet service provider?, IND. U.: U. INFO. TECH. SERVS. (May 17, 2011),
http://kb.iu.edu/data/ahoz.html. They are typically commercial in nature and
some examples include Time Warner, Comcast, and Verizon. Id.
62
See, e.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does 1–11, No. 12-cv-368–WQH (NLS), 2012 WL
684763, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (“Because the transactions in question
occurred entirely online, the defendants have been elusive and the IP addresses and
ISP are the only available identifying information. Without the requested discovery
[compelling the ISP to identify the users behind the IP addresses], there are no other
measures Plaintiff can take to identify the personal information for the Doe defendants.”)
(emphasis added).
63
MAC addresses “allow computers to uniquely identify themselves on a
network . . . . The MAC address generally remains fixed and follows the network
device, but the IP address changes as the network device moves from one network to
another.” Bradley Mitchell, The MAC Address — An Introduction to MAC Addressing,
ABOUT.COM, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/networkprotocolsip/l/aa0622
02a.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). Thus, the MAC address identifies the specific
computer that was allegedly used in the infringing activity.
64
See, e.g., Reply in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoenas Issued to Non-Party
Internet Service Providers Bright House Networks, LLC et al. at 2, AF Holdings LLC
v. Does 1–1,058, No. 1:12-cv-00048-BAH (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2012), ECF No. 26;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Third Party Time Warner
Cable Inc.’s Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena at 9–10, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino
Beteiligungs GBMH & Co. KG v. Does 1–2,094, No. 10-453, 2010 WL 2553275
(D.D.C. May 13, 2010).
65
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Serve Third Party Subpoenas Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference at 3, Malibu Media,
LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2012), ECF No. 4
(“Plaintiff seeks leave of Court to serve a Rule 45 subpoena on the ISPs and any
related intermediary ISPs. Any such subpoena will demand the true name, address,
telephone number, e-mail address and [MAC] address of the Defendant to whom
the ISP issued an IP address.”).

MORTENSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/28/2013 2:06 PM

COMMENT

1115

66

motions, especially because ISPs retain logs of the activity of IP
67
addresses for only a limited time.
Once the true identities of the Doe defendants are known, the
fifth and final step is to elicit settlements from the alleged
68
infringers. As described above, these settlement offers will give the
defendants the opportunity to settle the case for a relatively
69
inexpensive fee.
At the same time, the offer will remind the
defendant of the risks associated with appearing in court, including
70
time, money, and reputation costs. If the alleged infringer agrees to
the settlement payment, the plaintiff will voluntarily dismiss that
71
particular Doe from the lawsuit with prejudice.
72
Very few of these actions, if any, reach the trial stage. This is
66

See, e.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–96, No. C-11-03335, 2011 WL 4502413, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (“When a defendant’s identify is not known at the time
a complaint is filed, courts often grant plaintiffs early discovery to determine the doe
defendants’ identities.”).
67
See,
e.g.,
Data
Retention,
ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY
INFO.
CENTER,
http://epic.org/privacy/intl/data_retention.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
68
See Offer Letter, supra note 4; Nate Anderson, Settle Up: Voicemails Show P2P
TECHNICA
(Apr.
20,
2011),
Porn
Law
Firms
in
Action,
ARS
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/04/settle-up-voicemails-show-p2p-pornlaw-firms-in-action/.
69
See sources cited supra note 68.
70
See sources cited supra note 68.
71
See, e.g., Memorandum RE: Outstanding Motions, Expedited Discovery, and
Bellwether Trial at 6–7, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088MMB (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2012), ECF No. 29 [hereinafter Bellwether Trial Memo]
(“Plaintiff’s counsel candidly advised the Court that . . . [i]f the John Doe defendant
who receives the letter agrees to pay, Plaintiff dismisses the complaint against that
defendant with prejudice and without any further court proceedings, thus avoiding
the public disclosure of the defendant’s identity.”). Cf. Plaintiff’s Notice of
Settlement and Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice of John Doe 6 Only at 1, Malibu
Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2012), ECF
No. 16 (“Plaintiff has settled this matter with John Doe 6 (‘Defendant’). Pursuant to
the settlement agreement’s terms, Plaintiff hereby voluntary [sic] dismisses
Defendant from this action with prejudice.”) (emphasis in original).
72
Despite filing claims against over 15,000 alleged illegal downloaders, Prenda
Law admitted that “no defendants have been served” in their BitTorrent actions. Ex.
A to Declaration of Charles E. Piehl in Response to Minute Order at 4–6, AF
Holdings LLC v. Does 1–135, No. 5:11-cv-03336 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012), ECF No.
43. Additionally, Patrick Collins, Inc. “has sued at least 11,570 John Doe Defendants
in litigation around the country without ever serving a single defendant.” Order on
Pending Motions for Ex Parte Discovery and Order to Show Cause at 5, Patrick
Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–79, No. 1:12-cv-10532-GAO (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2012), ECF No.
51. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation, and American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation’s
Capital in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoenas Issued to Non-Party Internet
Service Providers at 2, AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–1058, No. 1:12-cv-00048 (BAH)
(D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2012), ECF No. 24 [hereinafter Brief of Amici]; Amicus Curiae
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not surprising since trial is not the true goal of this litigation.
Instead, the goal is to obtain the true identities of the anonymous IP
addresses in the least expensive way possible in order to maximize the
74
copyright troll’s return on investment in the settlement letters.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION

The difficult starting point for analyzing BitTorrent copyright
litigation is acknowledging the difference between copyright trolls
75
and more “legitimate” copyright holders. Additionally, the levels of
culpability among a given pool of alleged illegal downloaders most
likely varies widely: for every “Adrienne Neal” who is factually
innocent and has never even heard of the copyrighted material in
question, let alone intentionally downloaded it, there is presumably a
76
sophisticated pirate who is factually guilty and deserves punishment.

Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Brief Requesting Reconsideration and Stay of Dec.
21 Order at 1, Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does 1–1495, No. 1:11-cv-01741
(D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2012).
73
Bellwether Trial Memo, supra note 71, at 6–7 (“Plaintiff’s counsel candidly
advised the Court that the Plaintiff’s strategy is, after initiating the lawsuits, to seek
leave to serve third-party subpoenas on the ISPs to obtain identification information
for the IP addresses specified in Exhibit A to the Complaints. When Plaintiff receives
this information from the ISPs, it contacts the subscribers associated with the IP
addresses, usually by letter, advising them of the lawsuits and offering them the
opportunity to settle by payment of a monetary sum.”).
74
See id.; Brief of Amici, supra note 72, at 2.
75
Although the line is admittedly blurry, copyright trolls might be characterized
as plaintiffs who leverage the significant damages available to copyright holders to
extract quick settlements, whereas a legitimate copyright plaintiff could be a content
creator who is genuinely interested in protecting the inherent or market value of his
or her work. Balganesh gets to the heart of the matter by analyzing incentive
structures:
The traditional copyright owner’s decision whether to enforce an
actionable claim or not is thought to derive primarily (though not
exclusively) from copyright’s fundamental purposes as an inducement
for creativity. Commencing an action for infringement is presumed to
be a viable option principally when the harm from such infringement
interferes in some way with (or is likely to interfere with) the market
for creative works. A copyright owner’s decision to sue a copier thus
represents the belief that the copying in question is harming the
owner’s ability to exploit the market for the copyrighted work. . . .
What makes the troll’s disruption of the under-enforcement
equilibrium problematic then is the fact that its reasons for doing so
bear no relationship whatsoever to the market for creative works . . . .
Its incentives to sue for copyright infringement emanate from
motivations that diverge rather fundamentally from the social reasons
for the very existence of the copyright system.
Balganesh, supra note 38, at 6–7 (internal citations omitted).
76
To further complicate the matter, it is likely that any sophisticated pirate who
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Courts are thus divided on how to best preside over these types of
77
The disparate parties and stakeholders involved make it
cases.
78
difficult to precisely formulate a “silver bullet” solution. Instead, the
best way to eliminate copyright trolls is through a combination of
safeguards that judges can use at their discretion after applying a
79
“smell test.” Because the copyright trolls in these lawsuits “have in
80
theory violated none of the law’s formal rules and principles,” a
“smell test” is necessary to determine the true motives of the plaintiff.
Although courts cannot ignore an allegation of copyright
infringement, a judge can use his discretion over matters such as
joinder, right to anonymity, and statutory damages to rein in
copyright trolls if the judge has reason to believe that the plaintiff is
abusing the rules of procedure in order to obtain names and
addresses to send threatening settlement offers.

is most deserving of punishment uses a Virtual Private Network (VPN) that prevents
them from being caught. A VPN “is a private network that uses a public network
(usually the Internet) to connect remote sites or users together. . . . [A]nyone
intercepting the encrypted data can’t read it.” Jeff Tyson & Stephanie Crawford,
How VPNs Work, HOW STUFF WORKS (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.howstuffworks.com
/vpn.htm; see also Alan Henry, Why You Should Start Using a VPN (and How to Choose the
Best One for Your Needs), LIFEHACKER (Sept. 5, 2012, 8:00 AM),
http://lifehacker.com/5940565/why-you-should-start-using-a-vpn-and-how-to-choosethe-best-one-for-your-needs (“VPNs are the only way to stay safe when using
something like BitTorrent—everything else is just a false sense of security. Better
safe than trying to defend yourself in court or paying a massive fine for something
you may or may not have even done, right?”).
77
See cases discussed infra. As of this writing, no case involving John Doe
defendants accused of violating copyright by using BitTorrent has been decided on
the merits at an appellate level—which is not surprising since no case has been fully
litigated. One case of particular interest, however, is Malibu Media, LLC v. John
Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 19, 2012). In that case, Judge
Baylson has taken the unusual step of ordering a bellwether trial, currently
scheduled to begin after this Comment has gone to print. See Bellwether Trial
Memo, supra note 71; Revised Scheduling Order, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–
22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2013), ECF No. 86. “In a bellwether
trial procedure, a random sample of cases large enough to yield reliable results is
tried to a jury. A judge, jury, or participating lawyers use the resulting verdicts as a
basis for resolving the remaining cases.” Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577 (2008).
78
A “silver bullet” is “a quick solution to a difficult problem.” Silver Bullet,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/silver+bullet (last visited
Feb. 11, 2013).
79
As used in this context, the “smell test” involves an ad hoc evaluation of the
plaintiff that takes into consideration factors such as the underlying copyrighted
work and the plaintiff’s willingness to litigate the matter through trial.
80
Balganesh, supra note 38, at 7.
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A. Joinder Must at Least be Limited to Only Those Who Reside in the
District in Which the Lawsuit is Pending
As described above, copyright trolls will usually seek to join
numerous anonymous Doe defendants together into a single lawsuit
81
under Rule 20.
This part will (1) give a refresher on the legal
concepts implicated, (2) briefly trace the evolution of file-sharing and
give an overview of BitTorrent technology, and (3) then argue that
wholesale joinder of anonymous IP addresses is inappropriate.
1.

Joinder and Personal Jurisdiction

A 2001 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
82
made those rules unequivocally applicable to copyright litigation.
Rule 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants in one
action if: “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all
83
defendants will arise in the action.” Under Rule 20(b), however,
84
joinder is not mandatory. Even if the Rule 20(a)(2) conditions are
met, the court may order separate trials to protect any party against
85
“embarrassment, delay, expense, or other prejudice.”
Moreover,
permissive joinder under Rule 20 must “comport with the principles
86
of fundamental fairness.”
The court is permitted to sever
improperly joined parties at any time, as long as the severance is on
87
A
just terms and the entire action is not dismissed outright.
decision to sever is made on the court’s own motion or on a party’s
88
motion.
When considering joinder in the context of BitTorrent
81

See supra Part II.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 81 advisory committee’s note (“Former Copyright Rule 1
made the Civil Rules applicable to copyright proceedings except to the extent the
Civil Rules were inconsistent with Copyright Rules. Abrogation of the Copyright
Rules leaves the Civil Rules fully applicable to copyright proceedings. Rule 81(a)(1)
is amended to reflect this change.”).
83
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2).
84
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b).
85
Id.
86
Coleman v. Quaker Oats, 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal
citation omitted). Although the Supreme Court has held that “joinder of claims,
parties and remedies is strongly encouraged,” joinder must remain “consistent with
fairness to the parties.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724
(1966).
87
FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
88
Id.
82
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copyright litigation, it is important to keep the concept of personal
jurisdiction in mind. Without personal jurisdiction, a court lacks the
89
Although
power to impose its decisions on a particular party.
90
modern personal jusrisdiction jurisprudence is not straightforward,
generally, in order for a court to have personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, the defendant must: consent to or waive personal
91
92
jurisdiction; be present or domiciled in the jurisdiction; have
93
certain minimum contacts with the jurisdiction; or have a
94
reasonable expectation of facing suit in the jurisdiction. Personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence is grounded largely in the U.S.
Constitution via the Due Process Clause and much of the analysis
focuses on whether subjecting the defendant to suit in a particular
jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair play and
95
substantial justice.”
Although courts generally do not have the
96
authority to dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction sua sponte,
such an analysis is indeed proper when a defendant does not appear
97
and the court is determining whether to award a default judgment.
2.

The Evolution of File-Sharing and an Explanation of
98
the BitTorrent Protocol

The underlying file-sharing technology that many use to illegally
99
download copyrighted works has become more advanced over the
years—it is now easier for users to download copyrighted works, while

89

LARRY R. TEPLY, RALPH U. WHITTEN & DENIS F. MCLAUGHLIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CASES, TEXT, NOTES, AND PROBLEMS 28 (2d ed. 2008).
90
Bryce A. Lenox, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Teaching the Stream of
Commerce Dog New Tricks: CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996),
22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 333 (1997) (“The path of personal jurisdiction over the
last century has been a rocky one . . . .”).
91
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
92
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940).
93
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
94
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
95
Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463.
96
Pilgrim Badge & Label Corp. v. Barrios, 857 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]he
caselaw appears uniform in concluding that a district court has no authority, sua
sponte, to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.”).
97
See, e.g., Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207,
214 (2d Cir. 2010); Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.
1986).
98
For a video explanation of BitTorrent, see David King, BitTorrent, Explained,
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYTvTPrgSiM (uploaded Oct. 12,
2010).
99
File-sharing is not the only way to illegally obtain copyrighted works on the
Internet, but the legal issue discussed in this Comment is exclusive to it.
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it is harder to simply shut down an illegal service in the hopes of
100
stemming the tide of digital piracy.
Since the early 1980s, the “traditional” client-server model has
101
disseminated data across networks.
In a traditional file-transfer
process, a file is stored on a server and the server is stored on a
102
network, such as the Internet. Other computers connected to that
network can send messages to the host server, letting it know that it
103
would like to copy the stored file. When a connection is established
between the host server and the requesting computer, the requesting
computer becomes a “client” and copies the file from the host
104
server. The traditional model is completely one-sided in the sense
that the client never shares any of its resources, such as processing
105
power or hard-drive space.
Even though an individual client may
106
only consume a small amount of bandwidth in this traditional
scenario, the host server can consume extraordinary amounts of
107
bandwidth if many clients attempt to obtain the file from the host.
Therefore, in order to reduce the cost of bandwidth consumption,
host servers will often put a cap on the number of clients that can
simultaneously obtain the file, in addition to putting a cap on how
108
fast each client can download the file. A common example of the
traditional model is a website such as http://www.espn.com, which
resides on the Internet and stores all of the associated files (photos,
109
audio, video, etc.) on its server. When the client requests a certain
page of the website by clicking on a link, for example, the server
responds by sending the page and all associated content, such as
100

See, e.g., Ernesto, Anonymous, Decentralized and Uncensored File-Sharing is Booming,
TORRENTFREAK (Mar. 3, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-decentralizedand-uncensored-file-sharing-is-booming-120302/.
101
Ankur R. Patel, BitTorrent Beware: Legitimizing BitTorrent Against Secondary
Copyright Liability, 10 APPALACHIAN J.L. 117, 118 (2010–2011) (citing WEIJIA JIA &
WANLEI ZHOU, DISTRIBUTED NETWORK SYSTEMS: FROM CONCEPTS TO IMPLEMENTATIONS 6
(2004)).
102
Michael Brown, White Paper: How BitTorrent Works, MAXIMUMPC (July 10, 2009,
7:00 AM), http://www.maximumpc.com/article/features/white_paper_bittorrent.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Patel, supra note 101, at 119.
106
“Bandwidth is a term used to describe how much information can be
transmitted over a connection.”
What is Bandwidth?, WISEGEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-bandwidth.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). It is
usually expressed as “bits per second” and so the greater the bandwidth, the greater
the data transfer. Id.
107
Brown, supra note 102.
108
Id.
109
Patel, supra note 101, at 119.
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110

photos or videos.
P2P sharing eliminates the need for a central server to host
111
files.
Instead, the files are stored on the individual users’
computers; when one downloads a file on a P2P network, he or she
downloads the file from another user of the P2P network instead of
112
downloading the file from a central location.
Every member, or
“peer,” acts as both a client (by requesting data from other peers)
and as a server (by contributing a portion of their computing
113
resources to the network as a whole). Napster is one of the earliest
114
In a typical
and most influential examples of P2P technology.
Napster transaction, Peer A would request a file from Peer B, who
115
stored the file on his own computer.
Peer B would respond by
sending the file; Peer A would assist by contributing a portion of its
116
Napster, however, suffered from a
resources to the transaction.
limitation because it used a central server to keep track of connected
117
computers and the files available on them. Napster’s central server
was its downfall—a court construed the central server as evidence
118
that Napster knowingly facilitated copyright infringement.
119
BitTorrent is a protocol that does not rely on a central server
to establish download connections for users—a distinct advantage
120
over earlier P2P software such as Napster. Instead, it decentralizes
121
This decentralized approach makes it
data among the users.
virtually impossible to shut down BitTorrent, since no central server
122
maintains a comprehensive index of active users.
Furthermore,

110

Id.
Jeff Tyson, How the Old Napster Worked, HOW STUFF WORKS,
http://www.howstuffworks.com/napster.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
112
Id.
113
Patel, supra note 101, at 119.
114
See generally HILLARY J. MORGAN, NAPSTER’S INFLUENCE ON INTERNET COPYRIGHT
LAW (2002); Symposium, Beyond Napster: Debating the Future of Copyright on the Internet,
50 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (2001)..
115
Tyson, supra note 111.
116
Id.
117
Brown, supra note 102.
118
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part sub nom., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001).
119
BitTorrent is a “set of rules” that allows for this certain type of file-sharing.
STUFF
WORKS,
Carmen
Carmack,
How
BitTorrent
Works,
HOW
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/bittorrent.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
120
Brown, supra note 102.
121
Id.
122
Id.
111
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BitTorrent overcomes the speed limitations associated with the
traditional client-server method; it breaks down a larger file into
smaller component pieces, which each user, or peer, can then
123
share.
Once a user has downloaded all of the components to his
124
computer, they are reassembled back into the original file.
Practically speaking, the more popular a file, the faster it will
download because additional “peers” increase the ability to download
125
all the component pieces.
This ease of use and potentially
increased download speed has made BitTorrent an attractive option
for those seeking to download copyrighted works. Even though there
126
are legal uses for BitTorrent software, a Princeton student’s 2010
study found that eighty-five to ninety-nine percent of files distributed
127
by BitTorrent infringed copyright. As a result, some in the content
industry believe that BitTorrent is to stealing movies what “bolt128
cutters are to stealing bicycles.”
BitTorrent requires that one person act as an initial “seed” and
129
make the entire file available to the network.
In order to share a
file via BitTorrent, the person offering the initial file—the “seeder”—
130
must first create a “.torrent” file, which contains information on the
123

Id.
Id. (“Each peer distributing a file breaks it into chunks ranging from 64KB to
4MB in size and creates a checksum for each chunk using a hashing algorithm.
When another peer receives these chunks, it matches its checksum to the checksum
recorded in the torrent file to verify its integrity.”).
125
Brown, supra note 102. Furthermore, generally a peer “who contributes
quickly tends to receive quickly,” thus incentivizing users to devote more bandwidth
to the exchange. Michael Piatek et al., Building BitTyrant, a (More) Strategic BitTorrent
Client, 32 LOGIN 8, 10 (2007), available at http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/arv
ind/papers/login-bt.pdf.
126
See, e.g., Janko Roettgers, 10 More Sites for Free and Legal Torrents, GIGAOM (Feb.
5, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/video/ten-more-sites-for-free-and-legaltorrents/.
127
ROBERT LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE
CULTURE BUSINESS AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK 55 (2011).
128
Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual Property: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Scott Turow,
President, Authors Guild), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-216%20Turow%20Testimony.pdf.
129
Brown, supra note 102.
130
The .torrent file may become a thing of the past with the dissemination of
“magnet links” on index sites such as The Pirate Bay. This is designed to make such
index sites less vulnerable to lawsuits. See, e.g., Ernesto, The Pirate Bay Says Goodbye to
(Feb.
13,
2012),
(Most)
Torrents
on
February
29,
TORRENTFREAK
http://torrentfreak.com/the-pirate-bay-says-goodbye-to-most-torrents-on-february-29120213/. The analysis, however, does not change for the end-user named in
BitTorrent lawsuits, so the switch from .torrent files to magnet links is not of huge
concern for this Comment.
124
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“tracker” and metadata about the underlying file, such as the size
133
Someone wishing to download the
of the component pieces.
underlying file (known as a “leecher”) will browse an index site, such
134
135
as The Pirate Bay, and locate the desired file. Once the .torrent
file is downloaded, the leecher opens the .torrent file with a
136
BitTorrent client, which establishes a connection between the
137
leecher and the tracker.
Once the connection to the tracker is
established, the tracker facilitates and enables the downloading of the
underlying file, directing the leecher to the location of the
138
component pieces.
As other users (peers) begin downloading the
file from the initial seed, they simultaneously begin uploading the
pieces they have already obtained or are in the process of obtaining
139
from other peers.
Accordingly, once a peer has fully downloaded
140
the entire file, he also becomes a seed. All of the peers, including
the initial seed, actively engaged in sharing a particular file are
141
collectively known as a “swarm.” It is not guaranteed, however, that
every member of a BitTorrent swarm will interact with every other

131

“A Bit Torrent tracker centrally coordinates the P2P transfer of files among
users . . . . Specifically, the tracker identifies the network location of each client . . .
[and] also tracks which fragment(s) of that file each client possesses, to assist in
efficient data sharing between clients.” Bradley Mitchell, What Is a BitTorrent Tracker?,
ABOUT.COM,
http://compnetworking.about.com/od/bittorrent/f/bttracker.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
132
“Simply put, metadata is data about data. It is descriptive information about a
particular data set, object, or resource, including how it is formatted, and when and
by whom it was collected.” What is Metadata?, IND. UNIV.: UNIV. INFO. TECH. SERVICES
(Oct. 22, 2010), http://kb.iu.edu/data/aopm.html.
133
Brown, supra note 102.
134
The Pirate Bay is “the worlds [sic] largest bittorrent tracker.” About, THE
PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se/about (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). According to
some industry observers, The Pirate Bay had twenty-five million users and
represented a tenth of all Internet traffic in the fall of 2008. LEVINE, supra note 127,
at 203.
135
Searching an index site for .torrent files instead of directly searching other
users’ computers for files to download (as was the case with Napster) provides an
extra layer of anonymity for BitTorrent users. WALLACE WANG, STEAL THIS COMPUTER
BOOK 4.0: WHAT THEY WON’T TELL YOU ABOUT THE INTERNET 79 (4th ed., 2006).
136
A BitTorrent client is software that a user will use to facilitate the downloading
of files from BitTorrent. For an overview of different clients see Ernesto, BitTorrent
Client Comparison, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 22, 2006), http://torrentfreak.com/bittorren
t-client-comparison/.
137
Brown, supra note 102.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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142

member within that swarm. The intersection of this complicated
technology and antiquted law is where the analysis gets murky.
3.

Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Require that Joinder be Limited

Judicial opinion is mixed on whether joinder of anonymous
defendants in a BitTorrent copyright action is appropriate at the
143
discovery stage, and judges are increasingly recognizing that this is a
144
question with no clear answer.
At the very least, it appears that
judges are growing more skeptical of joining thousands of
145
anonymous defendants together for discovery purposes, which is in
line with the most just reading of the underlying law.
a. Rule 20(a)(2) may be Satisfied, But Prejudice Exists
Under 20(b)
One downside of allowing wholesale joinder based merely on a
plaintiff’s allegations that all defendants engaged in the same
BitTorrent swarm is that it permits the most troubling aspect of the
“settlement letter factory” business model. This “worst-case scenario”
occurs when a factually innocent defendant, from the opposite side
of the country and without the means or knowledge to defend
herself, receives a settlement offer in the mail. This factually
innocent defendant is forced to choose whether to incur significant
142

LaFond, supra note 37, at 55 (“An individual device cannot, however, connect
to all peers in each swarm subset at the same time. Each peer is allowed to share with
only a fixed number (usually four) of other peers at a given time.”).
143
This is something of an understatement, as some judges reach contrary
conclusions even to their own prior decisions. Compare Order, K-Beech, Inc. v. John
Does 1–36, No. 11-cv-5058 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2011), ECF No. 30 (Kelly, J.) (finding
joinder improper), and Order, K-Beech, Inc. v. John Does 1–78, No. 11-cv-5060 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 3, 2011), ECF No. 13 (Schiller, J.) (same), with Malibu Media, LLC v. John
Does 1–15, No. 12-cv-2077, 2012 WL 3089383 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2012) (Kelly, J.)
(finding joinder proper), and Order, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–15, No. 12cv-2090 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2012), ECF No. 13 (Schiller, J.) (same).
144
Opinion & Order at 3, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–4, No. 1:12-cv02962-HB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012), ECF No. 11 (“The split in the district courts
regarding this [joinder] question is not likely to be resolved anytime soon.”);
Decision and Order at 11, Next Phase Distribution, Inc. v. Does 1–27, No. 1:12-cv03755-VM (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012), ECF No. 10 (“The fact that multiple courts, in
well-reasoned opinions, have arrived at opposing conclusions suggests that there is
no clearly correct answer to this [joinder] question.”).
145
Compare Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332
(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2011) (finding joinder of 5,583 anonymous defendants proper),
with Opinion & Order, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–4, No. 1:12-cv-02962-HB
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012), ECF No. 11 (finding joinder of four anonymous defendants
improper).
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expense to travel to and defend herself in the district in which the
lawsuit is pending, or simply comply with the settlement demand to
146
make the matter go away.
On the other hand, there is merit to the claim that use of
BitTorrent satisfies the requirements of Rule 20(a)(2) for permissive
joinder. Rule 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants
in one action if: “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences, and (B) any question of law or fact common to all
147
defendants will arise in the action.”
Members of a particular
BitTorrent swarm can be said to have participated in the “same
transaction” or “occurrence” which will result in at least one
“question of law or fact common to all defendants.” If one views a
BitTorrent swarm as a “transaction” or “occurrence,” then the IP
addresses comprising that swarm will be part of the “same
transaction” or “occurrence.” It can and should be presumed from a
plaintiff’s initial complaint that a BitTorrent user affirmatively
chooses to enter a particular swarm in order to make use of other
swarm members’ computer resources to download a particular file,
while at the same time offering up their own computer’s resources to
facilitate the downloads of other members of the swarm. Even
though being part of the same swarm does not guarantee interaction
148
between every swarm member, plaintiffs should not be required—
for purposes of Rule 20(a)(2) at the initial, nascent stage of
litigation—to prove that each member of the swarm actually
connected and swapped bits of data with each other. Defendants use
BitTorrent not to swap a file with certain, specific others, but to get

146

In one example of this “worst-case scenario,” the plaintiff filed suit in the
Northern District of California and tried joining over 5,000 anonymous defendants,
even though he conceded that “only [one] out of [seven] defendants were likely
using a California IP address when the alleged infringing behavior occurred, and
only [one] out of [five] of these California IP addresses were likely from the
Northern District of California.” On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1–5011, 280 F.R.D. 500,
504 (N.D. Cal. 2011). In another case, plaintiff conceded that approximately thirty
percent of Doe defendants were likely misidentified (i.e., that the person associated
with the IP address is not the one who committed the copyright infringement).
Digital Sin, Inc. v. John Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
147
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (emphasis added).
148
LaFond, supra note 37, at 55 (“An individual device cannot, however, connect
to all peers in each swarm subset at the same time. Each peer is allowed to share with
only a fixed number (usually four) of other peers at a given time.”). Thus, even if a
BitTorrent user affirmatively chooses to enter a swarm, he does not then choose
which particular members of the swarm with whom he will connect.
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the file as quickly as possible from whoever may be in the swarm.
The swarm is essentially the overarching infrastructure that allows the
150
swarm members to connect to one another. Therefore, evidence of
entering a particular swarm should satisfy the “same transaction” or
“occurrence” prong. Additionally, because the question of whether
the defendant committed copyright infringement will be a question
of law “common to all defendants,” the second prong should be
satisfied, since all that is required is that there be any common
question of law or fact. Therefore, proof that each defendant
entered a particular swarm should satisfy both elements of Rule
20(a)(2) for discovery purposes.
Where judges can flex their discretionary muscle, however, is
under Rule 20(b). Rule 20(b) states that even if the Rule 20(a)(2)
conditions are met, the court may order separate trials to protect
151
against “embarrassment, delay, expense, or other prejudice . . . .”
Judge Baylson, presiding in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
neatly summarized the various reasons courts have given for denying
joinder of Doe defendants in BitTorrent cases:
(i) the likelihood that each John Doe defendant will assert
different defenses, thereby adding factual and legal
questions that are not common among all defendants, (ii)
many John Doe defendants are proceeding pro se, and will
therefore incur significant expense serving papers and
attending depositions of all other parties to the lawsuit, (iii)
the likelihood that many of the John Doe defendants are
not the actual individuals who illegally downloaded the
motion pictures in question, (iv) the likelihood that joinder
will facilitate coercive settlements among the John Doe
defendants; and (v) plaintiff’s avoidance of paying filing
152
fees by pursuing mass actions.
These are generally practical reasons for denying joinder, all of which
fall within the discretionary “embarrassment, delay, expense, or other
149

Cf. Brown, supra note 102.
Id.
151
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). Additionally, the court is permitted to sever
improperly joined parties at any time, as long as the severance is on just terms and
the entire action is not dismissed outright. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
152
Bellwether Trial Memo, supra note 71, at 15–16 (citations omitted). As noted
above, I believe that the first ground for severing defendants—”each John Doe
defendant will assert different defenses, thereby adding factual and legal questions
that are not common among all defendants”—is an incorrect reading of FED. R. CIV.
P. 20(a)(2)(B), which only requires “any question of law or fact common to all
defendants . . . .” (emphasis added). Nevertheless, it is a valid reason for severing
under Rule 20(b).
150
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prejudice” bounds of Rule 20(b). As a result, judges are increasingly
growing wary of copyright trolls trying to use the federal courts as a
one-stop-shop to gain names and addresses to thereafter send
153
threatening settlement offers.
b. Because Personal Jurisdiction Can Only Be Based on
Domicile, Joinder Must be Similarly Limited
At the very least, joinder should be limited to only those
defendants who are domiciled in the judicial district in which the
lawsuit is pending. This requirement is in line with 28 U.S.C. §
1400(a), the statute that governs venue for claims asserted under the
Copyright Act, which states that “Civil actions, suits, or proceedings
arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights . . . may be
instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides
154
or may be found.”
More fundamentally, limiting joinder in this
manner comports with the co-principles of personal jurisdiction and
155
As
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
mentioned in Part III.A.1.a supra, generally, in order for a court to
have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must:
156
consent to or waive personal jurisdiction; be physically present or
157
domiciled in the jurisdiction; have certain minimum contacts with
158
the jurisdiction; or have a reasonable expectation of facing suit in
159
the jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction—for purposes of joinder and
discovery—in BitTorrent copyright cases can only be based off of
presence or domicile within the jurisdiction.
First, it is reasonable to assume that a Doe defendant would not
consent to or waive personal jurisdiction in these circumstances.
Second, “certain minimum contacts” and “reasonable expectation of
153

See IO Group, Inc. v. Does 1–435, No. 10-4382-SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14123,
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011) (“Plaintiff’s motive for seeking joinder, therefore, is to
keep its own litigation costs down in hopes that defendants will accept a low initial
settlement demand. However, filing one mass action in order to identify hundreds
of Doe defendants through pre-service discovery and facilitate mass settlement, is not
what the joinder rules were established for.”); Order at 6, Malibu Media, LLC v. John
Does 1–10, No. 2:12-cv-03623-RGK-SS (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012), ECF No. 7 (“The
federal courts are not cogs in plaintiff’s copyright-enforcement business model. The
Court will not idly watch what is essentially an extortion scheme, for a case that
plaintiff has no intention of bringing to trial.”).
154
28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2012).
155
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
156
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
157
Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463–64.
158
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
159
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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facing suit in the jurisdiction” should not be deemed satisfied based
solely on a defendant’s BitTorrent interaction with another
defendant in a particular jurisdiction. A hypothetical best explains
this point. Assume, for example, that a plaintiff files a BitTorrent
copyright suit in the District of New Jersey, alleging that he observed
two defendants in a particular BitTorent swarm illegally downloading
his client’s copyrighted film. Based on the IP addresses, the plaintiff
knows that Doe CA is located in California while Doe NJ is from New
160
Jersey.
The plaintiff argues that New Jersey has personal
jurisdiction over Doe CA because Doe CA swapped bits of data with
Doe NJ while in the swarm, such that Doe CA had minimum contacts
with New Jersey or reasonably expected to face suit there.
This minimum contacts argument is particularly belied by
Hanson v. Denckla in which the Court held that in addition to
minimum contacts, there must be “some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
161
its laws.”
Entering a BitTorrent swarm from a computer in
California and then unintentionally being connected to a swarm
member in New Jersey can hardly be characterized as personal
availment to the extent that the California resident is “invoking the
benefits and protections” of New Jersey laws. It should not be
presumed for discovery and joinder purposes that a defendant
specifically directed BitTorrent activity to a particular jurisdiction,
i.e., that Doe CA specifically directed his BitTorrent client to
download the file only from other swarm members who are located in
New Jersey. Instead, the court should presume that a BitTorrent user
does not care where the other members of the swarm are located, so
long as he can download the file. For these reasons, it also cannot be
said that a BitTorrent user reasonably expects to face suit in all of the
jurisdictions where the other members of the BitTorrent swarm are
located.
This is especially true when dealing with anonymous Doe
defendants at the earliest stages of litigation because it is not certain
that the person associated with the IP address—the person who is
potentially being dragged into court hundreds of miles away—
162
committed the act at all. Indeed, as one judge pointed out, “it is no
160

See, e.g., Geolocation Service, INFOSNIPER, http://www.infosniper.net (last visited
Mar. 20, 2013) (showing on a map where a particular IP address is located).
161
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
162
See Order & Report & Recommendation at 6–8, In re BitTorrent Adult Film
Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 2:11-cv-03995-DRH-GRB (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012),
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more likely that the subscriber to an IP address carried out a
particular computer function . . . than to say an individual who pays
163
The risk of “false
the telephone bill made a specific phone call.”
positives”—even when the subuscriber information is known—is very
164
real and must not be downplayed.
c. Joinder of Even Defandants Residing in the Judicial
District can be Denied if the Judge Suspects the
Plaintiff of Being a Copyright Troll
Even if the ceiling of those who can be joined are those
defendants residing in the judicial district in which the action is filed
because of personal jurisdiction, judges can limit joinder even further
165
via Rule 20(b). Thus, judges should use a “smell test” when ruling
on such motions. Part of this “smell test” should include looking to
dockets across the country to see if the plaintiff or their counsel is a
repeat filer, and if so, determining how many defendants have
actually been served with a complaint for purposes of litigating the
claim. Additionally, if the plaintiff before the judge cannot formulate
a bona fide discovery plan that will enable the lawsuit to proceed, the
judge should err on the side of severance.
Under such
circumstances, plaintiffs should be required to file individually
against each defendant and not be allowed to skip out on the $350
filing fee they would otherwise pay. Judges must be wary of plaintiffs
who do not have a good faith interest in using the federal courts as a
forum to fairly litigate a dispute and who instead view the courts and
the rules of civil procedure as devices to be manipulated in an
extortive manner.
B. John Doe Defendants Should Remain Anonymous During Early
Stages of Litigation
As described in Part II, the most crucial element of copyright
trolls’ settlement letter factory business model is finding out the true
identities of the anonymous IP addresses, as this allows plaintiffs to

ECF No. 39 (outlining reasons why an IP address alone is insufficient to identify the
infringer).
163
Id.
164
Digital Sin, Inc. v. John Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(plaintiff conceded that approximately thirty percent of Doe defendants were likely
misidentified—i.e., the person associated with the IP address was not the one who
committed the copyright infringement). Furthermore, it is unclear how the plaintiff
arrived at this number, and so the rate of misidentification could be even higher still.
165
See discussion in Part III.A.3.a supra.
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send settlement offers. Until the plaintiffs convince the court that
they intend to actually litigate the claim of copyright infringement—
and are not simply fishing for names and addresses to send
settlement offers—the court should keep the true identities of the
alleged infringers hidden from the plaintiffs.
Allowing a defendant to proceed anonymously in the court
proceedings is substantively different from allowing a defendant to
remain anonymous entirely. Although the First Amendment protects
166
167
anonymous speech, and its protections extend to the Internet, the
First Amendment does not allow citizens to commit copyright
infringement on the Internet simply by labeling the action
168
“anonymous speech.”
Therefore, once the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of
copyright infringement in the complaint, the court should allow for
expedited discovery to uncover the true identities behind the IP
addresses. Importantly, however, under Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an
order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
169
oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .”
Allowing Doe
defendants to remain anonymous throughout the proceedings is
proper even though the public has a “legitimate interest” in knowing
170
the identities of parties involved in litigation in the federal courts.
Keeping the defendants’ identities anonymous for the initial stages of
litigation will protect them from being harassed by overzealous
copyright trolls merely hoping to extract quick settlement dollars.
Although there is a “presumption of openness in judicial
171
proceedings,” the court, in its discretion, can grant the “rare
dispensation” of anonymity, so long as the court inquires into the
172
circumstance of the particular case before doing so.
166

See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found. Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199–200
(1999).
167
See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
168
Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562–63 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“The First Amendment . . . does not protect copyright infringement, and the
Supreme Court, accordingly, has rejected First Amendment challenges to copyright
infringement actions.”) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 555–56 (1985)).
169
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
170
Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992).
171
Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[P]arties to a lawsuit must
typically openly identify themselves in their pleadings . . . .”).
172
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting
James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.1993)).
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Balancing the public interest against fairness to the parties shows
that anonymity is proper in BitTorrent copyright cases. First, the
public interest in learning whose IP address was used to allegedly
download pornography illegally from the Internet is presumably low.
Second, because at the early discovery stage it is far from clear that
the person whose name is associated with the IP address is the person
173
who actually committed the illegal download, it is reasonable to
keep the IP account holder’s identity private, particularly when
embarrassing content such as pornography is the basis of the lawsuit.
Finally, the “smell test” is also of use here. If the court has reason to
believe that the plaintiff has no intention of actually litigating the
copyright claim, it is reasonable to keep the identities anonymous in
order to frustrate the “settlement letter factory” business model.
Therefore, the court should err on the side of granting protective
orders for all Doe defendants.
To reiterate, allowing the defendant to remain anonymous for
purposes of the early stages of litigation is not the same as allowing
174
copyright infringement to go unpunished. That is why courts who
decide to allow Doe defendants to remain anonymous should still
grant subpoenas on the ISPs in order to obtain the true identities of
the account holders. Once identified, though, this information
should be kept confidential and be known to the court only. From
there, the court can act as arbiter between the plaintiff and the
anonymous defendant to make sure that the settlement offers are
accurate and that undue harassment does not occur. If the plaintiff
shows a good faith interest in actually wanting to litigate the case, the
court could, at its discretion, lift the protective order as the litigation
progresses. Thus, allowing defendants to remain anonymous while
still subpoenaing the ISPs is an effective way to eliminate copyright
trolling while still keeping proper avenues of relief open and
available.

173

See supra notes 162–64 (outlining reasons why an IP address alone is
insufficient to identify the infringer).
174
To be sure, I agree that Doe defendants have “no cognizable claim of privacy
in their subscriber information.” Order at 3, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs
GMBH & Co KG v. Adrienne Neal and Does 1–139, No. 1:10-cv-00453-RMC (D.D.C.
Sept. 16, 2010), ECF No. 91 (holding that Does could not remain anonymous). The
crucial distinction that courts need to be aware of, however, is that there is a
difference between claims of privacy in the subscriber information in and of itself,
and that same subscriber information used in the context of “settlement letter
factory” copyright trolls. As is indicative of judicial response to copyright trolls in
general, the trend is thankfully moving towards recognizing such a distinction. See
Bellwether Trial Memo, supra note 71, at 14.
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C. Awarding of Statutory Minimum
The Copyright Act explicitly states that copyright infringers can
be held liable for either: (1) the copyright holder’s actual damages
and the infringer’s profits, or (2) statutory damages ranging from
$750 to $30,000 per infringement, if actual damages are difficult to
175
calculate.
If a copyright holder requests statutory damages, the
court can increase the maximum award to $150,000 if the court finds
176
Although
that “infringement was committed willfully . . . .”
statutory damages thus have a very broad range of $750 to $150,000,
it is within a judge’s discretion to decide how much to actually
177
award.
The availability of statutory damages has undoubtedly enabled
178
copyright trolls to flourish.
For example, copyright trolls often
make reference to the $150,000 per infringement upper limit when
179
sending settlement offers to alleged infringers. This is undoubtedly
included to frighten recipients into settling without putting up a
fight. As a result, there is a growing call for change regarding the
availability of statutory damages. For example, one commentator
believes that the best way to eliminate copyright trolls is to eliminate
180
statutory damages altogether.
Another contends that statutory
damages should be available only if some compensable harm can first
181
While there is certainly merit to both of these
be shown.
175

17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
Id. at § 504(c)(2).
177
Determination of the amount of statutory damages should be “as the court
considers just.” Id. at § 504(c)(1); see also Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland,
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
439, 502 n.313 (2009) (noting that “there is nothing that prevents courts from
refusing to award more than the statutory minimum without an offering of proof
that an amount in excess of the minimum is justified” and that this approach is in
line with the legislative history surrounding passage of the statutory damages
provision).
178
Balganesh, supra note 38, at 13 (noting the “real inducement” for the
existence of copyright trolls is statutory damages, “which render its business model
not just viable, but also potentially lucrative”).
179
See Offer Letter, supra note 4.
180
James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright
Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 108 (2012)
(“Removal of statutory damages is the best remedy for both compensating copyright
holders and protecting individuals from copyright troll suits . . . .”).
181
Balganesh, supra note 38, at 50. Balganesh offers a solution that “introduces a
heightened rule of standing for non-author plaintiffs,” in order to ensure that “the
basis of their legal claims, in theory, tracks those of actual authors/creators, who
copyright law is primarily designed to serve.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Ultimately,
Balganesh’s solution “would make the availability of statutory damages for nonauthor plaintiffs depend on their establishing the existence of some compensable
176
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suggestions, both would require Congressional action and thus would
182
take time to implement. In the meantime, the best course of action
to curb copyright trolling is to award the statutory minimum,
183
especially for default judgments. This course of action is even more
effective if the judge also denies joinder, requiring a separate filing
fee for each plaintiff. This will help handicap copyright trolls until
Congress chooses to act on altering statutory damages.
D. Remedies for Defendants to Encourage Them Not to Settle
One of the most problematic elements of BitTorrent copyright
litigation is that often the defendants simply do not have the money
to fight the charges in court, even if they are factually innocent. The
184
court should make defendants aware of certain remedies which
mitigate these concerns. First and foremost, the Copyright Act
185
specifically allows courts to award attorney’s fees.
This in itself
should encourage factually innocent defendants to come forward and
fight false claims in court. Additionally, defendants can file motions
186
187
under Rule 54(d) in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for costs

harm.” Id. (emphasis in original). The problem with this solution on its face,
however, is that authors of the copyrighted works are increasingly filing as plaintiffs.
182
Reselling Media Content: Seconds to Go, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2013, at 71
(“Congress could intervene and rejig the Copyright Act of 1976 . . . . But that would
require Washington to get its act together—a plotline so implausible that it would
make J.K. Rowling blush.”).
183
See, e.g., Order Granting Default Judgment, K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–54, No.
2:11-cv-01604-NVW (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2012), ECF No. 46; see also Samuelson &
Wheatland, supra note 177, at 501 (advocating for the awarding of the statutory
minimum when “the plaintiff lost no profits and the defendant made no profits from
the infringement, or when damages and profits are nominal or minimal”) (citation
omitted).
184
Although limited in scope, it is worth noting here that when the plaintiff filing
a John Doe BitTorrent copyright action is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
be able to require that plaintiff post an undertaking. Simply put, when an
unlicensed foreign corporation files suit in United States court, they may be required
to post a bond with the clerk of the court to ensure that defendant will recover its
statutorily entitled costs if plaintiff loses. See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Post
Undertaking, AF Holdings, LLC v. David Trinh, No. 3:12-cv-02393-CRB (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 9, 2012), ECF No. 23.
185
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its
discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the
United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the
court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs.”).
186
See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) (“[C]osts . . . should be allowed to the prevailing
party.”).
187
“Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
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to help defray any expenses they incur.
For particularly egregious conduct by copyright trolls, sanctions
188
under Rule 11 may be appropriate along with filing a complaint to
the state bar association. Additionally, defendants who feel they have
been unduly harassed could file a lawsuit against the plaintiff for
189
abuse of process. Although underused, the tort of abuse of process
is recognized by the United States Supreme Court, all fifty states, and
190
the District of Columbia. The exact requirements vary from state to
state, but generally the claim requires three elements: (1) wrongful
use of process; (2) to achieve an ulterior purpose; (3) with damages
191
resulting. As this Comment has shown by describing the common
practices of copyright trolls, there is a strong argument for finding
them liable under this standard.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts should be cognizant of copyright’s Constitutional goals of
192
193
promoting the useful arts and creation of new works.
Schemes
designed to simply wring money from alleged defendants do not
comport with these goals. Furthermore, allowing copyright trolls to
exist unchecked could fundamentally alter copyright protection by
encouraging creation of works solely to generate settlements. As the
digital revolution continues to transform industry and society, it is
imperative that copyright holders be allowed to protect their rights.
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
188
Sanctions under Rule 11 “may include nonmonetary directives; an order to
pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable
attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(c)(4).
189
“One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to
the other for harm caused by the abuse of process.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 682 (1977).
190
Jeffrey J. Utermohle, Look What They’ve Done to My Tort, Ma: The Unfortunate
Demise of “Abuse of Process” in Maryland, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002).
191
Id. at 8.
192
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Some question whether pornography “promotes
the useful arts” and thus whether it can be copyrighted at all. See Chris Matyszczyk,
Copyright defendant: Porn may be, um, unprotected, CNET (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-57372240-71/copyright-defendant-porn-maybe-um-unprotected.
193
Balganesh, supra note 9, at 1577 (“Copyright law is thus thought to exist
primarily to give authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter
disseminate their works publicly.”).
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Pirating copyrighted material on the Internet is illegal and must not
be allowed to flourish unchecked. There is a fine line, however,
between protecting rights and extortion. In the end, courts should
be respected as places where actual disputes are resolved; they should
not be exploited as a mere tool in a “settlement letter factory”
business.
This Comment has argued that the most effective way to rein in
copyright trolls is to use a “smell test” in conjunction with other
safeguards. In particular, judges in their discretion should limit
joinder of anonymous Doe defendants, allow such defendants to
remain anonymous throughout the early stages of litigation, and
award only the statutory minimum of damages if a defendant
defaults.
Additionally, remedies exist that should encourage
defendants not to settle if they are wrongly targeted by a copyright
troll. Copyright trolls are a blight on the federal judiciary and judges
should be proactive in restricting their abusive practices.

